This paper analyzes the role of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina for the promotion of social justice under the conditions of a triple transformation from war to peace and from a communist regime based on the Titoist self-management ideology to a liberal-democratic political regime and economic market system in three parts. The first section describes the political, constitutional and economic context during and after the collapse of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The second section describes and analyzes the constitutional and institutional arrangements established under the General Framework Agreement for Peace, concluded in Dayton/Ohio and Paris, 1995. The third section deals with the role of the Constitutional Court and analyzes with reference to its case law the interpretative doctrines developed in its adjudication of the right to property concerning different concepts of property and the right to work in the context of the constitutionally guaranteed right to return of refugees and restitution of property.
transformation into the Yugoslav kingdom in 1927, both characterized by Greater Serbian aspirations for hegemony. Finally, in the course of transformation from a communist one-party system to a multi-party system in 1990, this institutional mechanism became constitutionally entrenched and formed the basis for the first multi-party elections in November 1990. However, due to the strong ethnic polarization of society with the foundation of political parties along ethnonational lines, the results of these elections resembled more a census. 4 Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias: State-Building and Legitimitation, 1919 -1992 (Washington: Indiana University Press, 2006 , in particular 381-469. 7 The following description has been elaborated in detail by Marko, "Defective Democracy", fn 4 and Joseph Marko, "Ethnopolitics and Constitutional Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina," in Bosnia-Herzegovina since Dayton: Civic and Uncivic Values, eds. Ola Listhaug and Sabrina P. Ramet (Ravenna: Longo Editore, 2013) having renamed themselves in 1993 into Bosniacs, and Croats. This federation was also territorially delimited into so-called cantons. Eight of these cantons were populated with either Bosniac or Croat majority population, only two of them were called mixed cantons with no clear-cut majority population. At the federal level, the constitutional provisions introduced an ethno-national power sharing system for the legislative and executive powers, but also for the judiciary. In addition, the Washington Agreement also provided for a Confederation between the newly independent Republic of Croatia and FBiH.
In conclusion, before the end of the war the territorial and institutional make up of political units on the territory of BiH were characterized by a high degree of territorial and functional asymmetry. In addition, two neighboring states, Croatia and the so-called Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, composed of Serbia and Montenegro, both of them under the control of S. Milošević, were parties to the conflict, and there were many efforts of international organizations, in particular the United Nations, and the United States to mediate. However, only after the genocide against 8000 Muslim men and boys committed in Srebrenica in July 1995, they were also ready to intervene militarily in order to stop the war. preponderance of Bosniac judges and prosecutors with 71.72 % in relation to 23.26% of Croat origin, whereas only 5.0% of Serb origin were left in these bodies. The figures for the police forces are similar with slightly more Croats, but only 1.22% Serbs ( § 136).
In addition, after the end of the war with the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (GFAP), 14 December 1995, 9 there waswith the exception of police forces -no lustration of the entire civil service, the media or the educational system at all territorial levels so that, for instance, pupils could still learn in 2004 from history or geography textbooks in use in RS or the Croat majority cantons of FBiH that `their´ President is either S. Milošević or F. Tudjman with the respective capitals of the, however, neighbouring countries, i.e. Belgrade and Zagreb.
As far as socio-economic conditions are concerned, the entire institutional make up after the Dayton Peace Agreement remained not only strictly ethnically divided, but also created a huge, expensive state machinery with more than 1000 ministers at the level of cantons, entities and the state of BiH for a population of 3.5 million inhabitants after the war. This huge bureaucratic apparatus is and remains highly ineffective due to the complex allocation of competences and the ethnic divisions so that BiH remains aid dependent and thus without investment driven and sustainable economic development to this day. As can be seen from long-term trends, there was and still remains also a highly ethnically divided private labor market and official data delivered by the World Bank show an average value in the unemployment rate of 25.06% between 1991 and 2018 with the highest value of 31.11% in 2006. 10 However, as can be seen from reports, youth unemployment is even officially much higher and purportedly one of the highest world wide with approximately more than 60%.
"This climate is linked to the political situation", a figurehead in the Bosnian youth NGO sector argues, "instability, corruption, and complicated bureaucratic 9 See the text reprinted in International Legal Materials, 35, no.1 (1996), 75-168. procedure for development of new businesses or foreign investments." Then the report goes on:
It is this complex maze that youth looking for jobs must navigate; with most of the few employment opportunities secured through political connections and personal networks. As such, many qualified, well educated youthespecially those who are loath to give in to the political divisions -are left empty-handed after months of job searching. Most of the private-sector jobs that do exist offer very low wages and poor working conditions. ... The black economy -in which workers do not receive social security, health insurance, or pension payments from their employers -is ubiquitious. So the country now finds itself facing a significant brain drain, with educated, skilled youth deciding that it is easier to look for jobs outside the country ... About 150.000 young people have left since the war ended in 1995, with 10.000 leaving each year. Bosnians living abroad send home remittances that represent 13 percent of the country´s GDP, one of the world´s highest rate. 11
Against this political and socio-economic background, we have thus to see what the role of the judiciary, in particular of a constitutional court, can be in terms of social justice in a society in a three-fold transition from war to peace and from a communist regime with a more or less centrally planned economy to a liberal democracy based on a market economy.
II. THE POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM
As the title of the GFAP indicates, this is a framework agreement whose details are spelled out in eleven annexes concerning military matters, the rebuilding of state institutions, reconstruction of the war-torn economy and the return of refugees and IDPs with a strong international involvement for the achievement of these goals. Annex 3 of the GFAP regulates the first free multiparty elections after the war which had to be organized by the OSCE. Annex 6 establishes a Human Rights Commission, to be composed of an international Ombudsperson and a Human Rights Chamber, a body composed of fourteen judges, with a majority of eight judges including the President to be appointed by the Committee of 11 See "Why Bosnia has world´s highest youth unemployment rate," Youth Economic Opportunities, accessed August 18, 2019, https://youtheconomicopportunities.org/blog/2971/why-bosnia-has-worlds-highest-youth-unemploymentrate. Herzegovina" with its roots in the communist system.
Ministers of the
Annex 4, like any other modern constitution therefore regulates the basic legal system of BiH in terms of institutions and structures. Moreover, it includes a rudimentary human rights catalogue, but in Annex I to Annex 4 alltogether fifteen international human rights instruments were declared directly applicable in BiH, not the least the UN human rights instruments as well as the human and minority rights instruments within the Council of Europe framework. If analyzed both from a constitutional law and political science perspective, it becomes clear that this constitution, having been drafted by US-American lawyers during the negotiations in Dayton/Ohio, was conceived as a political compromise and institutional umbrella for the cease-fire on the ground with many legal lacunae to be filled later by the competent institutions of either the legislative or judicial branches.
A sketch of the institutional structures foreseen in the GFAP in general and Annex 4 in particular will show the following picture: SCR 217). As we will see from the case law of the Constitutional Court of BiH, this was even more so the case in BiH as a state and society still in transition after a protracted violent conflict. Since I have analyzed the implementation of the GFAP in terms of the functioning of the political party system in detail somewhere else, 16 I will focus in this paper on the comparative constitutional law issues for a constitutional system with a centralized judicial review mechanism.
Moreover, I will address the perennial questions of judicial review with regard to the swing of the pendulum between judicial self-restraint and judicial activism 
The Case-law of the Constitutional Court regarding Socio-economic

Rights
Hence, I will focus on two judgments of the Constitutional Court and the respective reasoning of the majority and dissenting opinions in order to uncover the ideological and legal-theoretical underpinnings concerning the interpretation, in particular methods of interpretation, of liberal human rights, including socio-economic rights in the context of the various spheres of transformation already mentioned above.
Case No. U-5/98
Already in 1998, the then Chair of the Presidency, Alija Izetbegović, submitted a request for judicial review with the allegation that more than It is, therefore, all the more important to reflect on the methods of interpretation in this case and to clarify which different normative force was given to different types of constitutional provisions? There is the rather abstract language of the preambular provisions of Annex 4 referring to the promotion of "the general welfare and economic growth through the protection of private property and the promotion of a market economy" in a situation of transformation from a communist to a democratic system.
However, there are the only seemingly much more concrete constitutional rules laid down in the enumeration of liberal human rights in Article II of the Dayton constitution, guaranteeing a "right to property" in general and the "right" of all refugees and IDPs "to freely to return to their homes of origin" and "the right, in accordance with Annex 7 the the General Framework Agreement, to have restored to them the property of which they were deprived in the course of hostilities since 1991 and to be compensated for any such property that cannot be restored to them."
Following from the request of Alija Izetbegović to abrogate Articles 58 and 59 of the RS constitution as violating these constitutional principles and rights, not only the meaning of the normative principle of a market economy, but also the normative substance of the right to property became a matter of strong dispute which was decided by the majority of the Constitutional The contested provisions read as follows:
Article 58, paragraph 1
Property rights and obligations relating to socially-owned resources and the conditions of transforming the resources into other forms of ownership shall be regulated by law.
Article 59
Natural resources, urban construction sites, real estate and goods of particular economic, cultural and historical significance determined by law to be of general interest, shall be state-owned.
Certain goods of general interest may also be privately owned property under the conditions determined by law. ...
As one can see from the text, there are the terms and concepts of "socially- The majority of the judges followed the opinion written by the judgerapporteur in this case, the author of this paper, by arguing that all constitutional provisions, that is, also the preambular provisions, establish "basic constitutional principles and goals for the functioning of Bosnia and Herzegovina … that must be perceived as constitutional guidelines or limitations for the exercise of the responsibilities of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Entities." ( § 13). In conclusion, the majority argues under § § 14 and 15, that there are at least two interpretative doctrines following from the constitutional principles and rights which must serve as a standard for judicial review:
First, the right to private property is not only an individual right, but also an "institutional safeguard" clause:
"Demonstrated by the relationship between `the protection of privately owned property´ and a market economy in the text of the Preamble and Article II of the Constitution of BiH, the right to property is not only an individual right, which requires judicial protection against any illegitimate state interference, but also an institutional safeguard as one of the prerequisites for a functioning market economy."
Second, there is a an absolute limitation against state interference into human rights, originally developed by German constitutional law as so called
Wesensgehaltssperre, that is, the absolute limitation to infringe the essence of a human right even through democratic legislation:
It follows from the case law of the European Court of Human Rights that in balancing the demands of the community's general interests, the State's interference with property rights and the requirements of the protection of individual rights, that such a fair balance presupposes the possibility of a balance, i.e. the factual existence of goods in privately owned property. If privately owned property can be reduced to next to nothing through legislation by nationalising, for instance, entire fields of industries, such legislation would fundamentally infringe on the right to property, and in particular, as it is viewed as a necessary requirement of a market economy expressly foreseen by the Constitution of BiH. Therefore, in the final analysis, the supremacy of the Constitution of BiH in accordance with Article III.3 (b), which supersedes, inter alia, the Constitutions of the Entities, would no longer have any reasonable meaning if it allowed the abolishment of privately owned property. This idea is expressed in the case law of Central European constitutional courts as `in no case may the essence of a basic right be encroached upon´, thereby establishing an absolute restriction on the infringement of constitutionally guaranteed rights through legislation.
By applying these standards of review, the Court argued under § 17 that the constitutional category of "socially owned" property, which -as a legacy of the former Titoist-communist self-management system -denies both private persons as well as the state the legal status to be considered the owner of property, can no longer be considered to conform to the requirements of the Dayton constitution outlined above, because it creates, in theory and practice, serious obstacles for any privatization process in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in particular for foreign direct investment to create sustainable economic growth and thus "to establish a properly functional market economy." However, following from judicial self-restraint, the majority of the Court also argued that the challenged provision could be read in two ways, either as a mere legislative authorization of the RS parliament or as a constitutional duty to transform all socially owned property into either private or state owned property in order to promote a mixed economy on the basis of a market system. The majority therefore argued on the basis of a constitutional doctrine to be found in many federal systems that a challenged provision must be upheld as long as it can be interpreted in conformity with the higher ranking law, so that the second alternative has to be applied and therefore it upheld the challenged provision of Article 58, paragraph 1 RS constitution.
In his dissenting opinion, judge Hans Danelius from Sweden and a former judge of the Swedish Supreme Court with, however, no tradition of constitutional judicial review and also a former member of the European Commission of Human Rights, did, based on his experience and the legal doctrines developed by these bodies, deny the first rule elaborated by the majority of the Court concerning a right to property to be seen not only as an individual right, but also as an "institutional safeguard" clause and the conclusion that the contested provision of the RS constitution must be interpreted as a positive duty:
Finally, with respect to the provisions in Article II of the Constitution of BiH, which guarantee the right to property in the context of the general protection of human rights, I find it natural to start the analysis by referring to Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights. That Article provides, inter alia, that every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions, that no one shall be deprived of his possessions except on specific enumerated conditions, and that the State shall be free to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest. It appears from the wording of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that it is intended to provide protection for the individual's existing property. The provision has generally been understood not to include any right to acquire property, and this interpretation has been confirmed by the In Article II, paragraph 3 of the Constitution of BiH, the right to property appears as one of numerous enumerated human rights, and there seems to be no reason why the protection of the right to property in this paragraph should be different from the protection provided by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
In other words, the right to property as a human right is an individual right. It does not impose obligations regarding the social and economic system of a country. It protects the property which an individual owns at a given moment and does not include any right for him to acquire other property in the future.
Moreover, the majority of the Constitutional Court abrogated the contested provisions of Article 59 RS constitution based on the interpretative doctrine of an absolute limitation for legislation to infringe the essence of human rights: 20 ...To declare natural resources, urban construction sites, and real estate to be state-owned property ex constitutione infringes on the very essence of privately owned property as an individual right and an institutional safeguard. 21. In addition, the ability to expropriate on behalf of the general interests of the State or society was an important element of the communist constitutional doctrine and must thus be viewed as a legacy of that period. If legislation can abolish constitutionally guaranteed rights by making reference to unspecified general interests, it would ridicule the basic principle of the rule of law, with the Constitution as paramount, because there is virtually nothing which could not be construed as of `general´ interest. Hence, the Constitutions of the Entities must not grant such broadly construable legislative authorizations that could deprive human rights of any meaning. Such a legal technique violates the principle of efficiency.
Case No. U-19/01
In the end, the second case to be dealt with in our context is Case No.
U-19/01. This was again an abstract review procedure challenging Article 152 of the RS Labour Law, having been adopted in 2000. This case is of special interest with regard to socio-economic rights in the narrower sense, that is, the right to work within the framework of the right of return of refugees and IDPs to their homes, that is, their towns and villages, and be provided with the necessary conditions to make a living in their familiar surroundings.
As can be seen from the reasoning of the Constitutional Court in case No.
U-5/98 Partial Decision 3, at § 88, one of the contextual elements established to judge discriminatory behaviour against returnees to RS was the discrepancy in numbers between so-called "minority returns", that is, Bosniacs and Croats willing to return to their homes of origin now under the Serb-dominated adminstration of RS, and the overall numbers of returnees insofar only 10.17% of all returnees did belong to the former category. Moreover, the unemployment rate among returnees was as high as 92%. 22 Seen against this background Article 152 of the Labour Law of RS stipulated:
Employees having an employment contract on the day of 31 December 1991 with an employer seated on the territory which is now part of Republika Srpska, whose working relationship with that employer was illegally terminated between that date and the effective date of this Law, shall have the right to file a request for severance pay within three months from the effective date of this Law.
Moreover, Article 158 established a commission to be appointed by the minister in charge of labor to finally decide on such requests with legally binding effect.
The majority opinion of the Constitutional Court in this case, when reasoning about a possible discriminatory intent of Article 152, made even an abstract reference to Article 6, § 1 of ICESCR as legal source to be taken into consideration, but found no evidence for direct or de jure discrimination by the legislator of RS and therefore went on to find out whether the distinction made in the text of Article 152 concerning "persons or groups to be compared" might amount in effect to an indirect or de facto discrimination between Serbs, Bosniacs and Croats due to the historical context of ethnic cleansing when employees were dismissed or put on waiting lists on ethnic grounds.
Hence, the majority went on to deliberate on the question whether Article 152 could be considered to have an objective and reasonable justification and established that the overall aim of the contested Article is "creating legal certainty for those companies that ceased or reduced their activities due to the war, and which were after the war faced with the problem of resuming their work under conditions of a market economy. Such legal certainty may also be essential for investors in such companies and for the general development of the economy of Bosnia and Herzegovina" ( § 25). On the other hand, the reasoning goes on, there is a right of those unlawfully dismissed or placed on a waiting list to be reinstated into their previous positions. Their reinstatement may not be possible in all cases and may largely depend on the economic conditions of their previous employer. Although this individual interest is of high importance, the Constitutional Court considers the public interest outlined above, could reasonably be considered to prevail ( § 26).
As can be seen from this reasoning, the majority opinion not only ignores to elaborate on the meaning of the right to work, including the right of everyone to the opportunity to gain his/her living by work which he/she freely chooses according to Article 6 § 1 ICESCR in the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also simply applies a mere rationality test in the terminology of the US Supreme Court between a highly abstract public interest, not in any way further empirically substantiated, and the "right"
to work, that is, to be reinstated after having been illegally dismissed on ethnic grounds and therefore being seriously discriminated against which is, moreover, linguistically denigrated to a simple "individual interest."
It must therefore come as no surprise that the author of this paper delivered a dissenting opinion in this case and argued that even the majority opinion had recognized that the effects of past de jure discrimination are upheld by Article 152 RS Labor law so that the contested provision must trigger `strict scrutiny´ for review in the terminology of the US Supreme Court, and thus the application of the proportionality principle as the European equivalent in terms of standards of review.
In conclusion, the dissenting opinion outlines that Article 6, § 1 ICESCR has to be read in conjunction with the provisions of Articles II. 5 of the Dayton constitution as a guaranteed right, not simply an individual interest so that the "balancing" of guaranteed rights against public interests requires that all elements of the proportionality test are strictly met. Hence, it has to be tested not only whether the means employed are legitimate and appropriate to achieve the objective, but also whether they are the least restrictive in the guarantee of rights that are available. Seen in this light, Article 152 does not meet the standards of the proportionality test. Its legitimacy must be contested since the recognized illegal dismissals in the past, which formed a part of an organized campaign of ethnic cleansing, are upheld and thereby legalized, creating new discrimination. Second, severance pays instead of reinstatement and the establishment of a commission instead of an independent court in the meaning of Article 6 ECHR to finally decide on requests are not the least restrictive means possible:
16. In times of prosperity, it would certainly be easier to maintain the present workforce while at the same time reinstate former employees. Also, some areas or branches of the labour market may face greater difficulties than others. However, it is a constitutional imperative of utmost importance not to uphold discriminatory practices or even create new legislation which discriminates in effect. Thus, the economic burden as a result of the war has to be proportionately distributed between all parts of the population as well as between the private sector and the state budget. An approach which transforms this constitutional obligation into an affirmative action plan to re-employ at least a certain number of Bosniac and Croat men and women would be less burdensome on the victims of discrimination while at the same time taking into account the present economic difficulties. Most importantly, it would give returnees the same chance to access the limited available positions as the majority Serb population presently have, and thereby bring the right to return into balance with the public interest in a sustainable economy. Lastly, such legal guidelines on a proportionate distribution of the existing positions according to criteria of professional qualification would meet the obligation of the public authorities to facilitate the return process.
Hence, the conclusion of the dissenting opinion:
17. In view of feasible alternatives which the majority Decision does not take into consideration, Article 152 of Labour Law of the RS, by categorically excluding any reinstatement nor providing for any equivalent solution, cannot be considered a necessary and proportionate means. Article 152 of Labour Law of the RS does not find a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed (symbolic compensation and exclusion of any reinstatement) and the aim sought to be realised (compensation for suffered discrimination under tight economic conditions). It is thus discriminatory and in violation of Article II.4 in conjunction with Article II.5 of Constitution and Article 6 § 1 ICESCR, Annex I of Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
As can be seen not only from these judgments, 23 Representatives in BiH, probably one of the two institutions constantly working for the reintegration of state and society inspite of the de facto ethno-national composition among `domestic´ judges and the participation of three international judges. Concerning the role of the latter in processes of constitutional adjudication, two phenomena must be highlighted. In terms of human rights protection, their role was to serve as translators and mediators for the domestic judges, because all of them had been trained under the communist system and therefore had no experience with the ECHR and its implementation in the member states of the Council of Europe or the case law of the European Court of Human Rights.
In this regard, all the judges irrespective of their ethnic feelings developed an esprit de corps concerning the protection of liberal, that is, negative human rights against infringements by public authorities.
Secondly, and astonishingly, as could be seen from the description and analysis 
